This paper studies a class of incentive schemes based on intervention, where there exists an intervention device that is able to monitor the actions of users and to take an action that affects the payoffs of users. We consider the case of perfect monitoring, where the intervention device can immediately observe the actions of users without errors. We also assume that there exist actions of the intervention device that are most and least preferred by all the users and the intervention device, regardless of the actions of users. We derive analytical results about the outcomes achievable with intervention, and illustrate our results with an example based on the Cournot model.
Introduction
This paper studies incentive schemes to drive self-interested users toward the system objective.
The operation of networks by non-cooperative, self-interested users in general leads to a suboptimal performance [1] . As a result, different forms of incentive schemes to improve the performance have been investigated in the literature. One form of incentive schemes widely studied in economics and engineering is pricing (or more generally, transfer of utilities) [2] . Pricing can induce efficient use of network resources by aligning private incentives with social objectives. Although pricing has a solid theoretical foundation, implementing a pricing scheme can be impractical or cumbersome in some cases. Let us consider a wireless Internet service as an example. A service provider can limit access to its network resources by charging an access fee. However, charging an access fee requires a secure and reliable method to process payments, which creates burden on both sides of users and service providers. There also arises the issue of allocative fairness when a service provider charges for the Internet service. In the presence of the income effect, uniform pricing will bias the allocation of network resources towards users with high incomes. Because the Internet can play the role of an information equalizer, it has been argued in a public policy debate that access to the Internet should be provided as a public good by a public authority rather than as a private good in a market [3] .
Another method to provide incentives is to use repeated interaction [4] . Repeated interaction can encourage cooperative behavior by adjusting future payoffs depending on current behavior. A repeated game strategy can form a basis of an incentive scheme in which monitoring and punishment burden is decentralized to users (see, for example, [5] ). However, implementing a repeated game strategy requires repeated interaction among users, which may not be available. For example, users interacting in a mobile network change frequently in nature.
In this paper, we study an alternative form of incentive schemes based on intervention, which was proposed in our previous work [6] . In an incentive scheme based on intervention, a network is augmented with an intervention device that is able to monitor the actions of users and to take an action that affects the payoffs of users. Intervention directly affects the network usage of users, unlike pricing which uses an outside instrument to affect the payoffs of users. Thus, an incentive scheme based on intervention can provide an effective and robust method to provide incentives in that users cannot avoid intervention as long as they use network resources. Moreover, it does not require long-term relationship among users, which makes it applicable to networks with a dynamically changing user population.
As a first step toward the study of incentive schemes based on intervention, we focus in this paper on the case of perfect monitoring, where the intervention device can immediately observe the actions chosen by users without errors. We derive analytical results assuming that there exist actions of the intervention device that are most and least preferred by all the users and the intervention device, regardless of the actions of users. We then illustrate our results with an example based on the Cournot model.
Model
We consider a network where N users and an intervention device interact. The set of the users is denoted by N = {1, . . . , N }. The action space of user i is denoted by A i , and the action of user i is denoted by a i ∈ A i , for all i ∈ N . An action profile is represented by a vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ A i∈N A i . An action profile of the users other than user i is written as a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a N ) so that a can be expressed as a = (a i , a −i ). The intervention device observes the actions chosen by the users immediately, and then it chooses its own action.
The action space of the intervention device is denoted by A 0 , and its action is denoted by a 0 ∈ A 0 .
For convenience, we sometimes call the intervention device user 0. The set of the users and the intervention device is denoted by N 0 = N ∪ {0}.
The actions of the intervention device and the users jointly determine their payoffs. The payoff function of user i ∈ N 0 is denoted by u i : A 0 × A → R. That is, u i (a 0 , a) represents the payoff that user i receives when the intervention device chooses action a 0 and the users choose an action profile a. In particular, the payoff of the intervention device, u 0 (a 0 , a), can be interpreted as the system objective. Since the intervention device can choose its action knowing the actions chosen by the users, a strategy for it can be represented by a function f : A → A 0 , which is called an intervention rule. The set of all possible intervention rules is denoted by F .
Suppose that there is a network manager who determines the intervention rule used by the intervention device. We assume that the manager can commit to an intervention rule, for example, by using a protocol embedded in the intervention device. The game played by the manager and the users is called an intervention game. The sequence of events in an intervention game can be listed as follows.
The manager chooses an intervention rule
2. The users choose their actions a ∈ A, knowing the intervention rule f chosen by the manager.
3. The intervention device observes the action profile a ∈ A and takes an action a 0 = f (a) ∈ A 0 . The payoff function of user i ∈ N 0 provided that the manager has chosen an intervention rule f is given by v
An intervention rule f induces a simultaneous game played by the users, whose normal form representation is given by
We can predict actions chosen by the users given an intervention rule f by applying the solution concept of Nash equilibrium to the induced game Γ f .
An action profile a * is sustainable if there exists an intervention rule f that sustains a * .
Let E(f ) ⊆ A be the set of action profiles sustained by f . Then the set of all sustainable action profiles is given by E = ∪ f ∈F E(f ). A pair of an intervention rule f and an action profile a is said to be attainable if f sustains a. The manager's problem is to find an attainable pair that maximizes the payoff of the intervention device among all attainable pairs.
for all (f, a) ∈ F × A such that a ∈ E(f ). f * ∈ F is an optimal intervention rule if there exists an action profile a * ∈ A such that (f * , a * ) is an intervention equilibrium.
Intervention equilibrium is a solution concept for intervention games, based on a backward induction argument. An intervention equilibrium can be considered as a subgame perfect equilibrium applied to an intervention game, since the induced game Γ f is a subgame of an intervention game.
It is implicitly assumed that the manager can induce the users to choose the best Nash equilibrium for the system in case of multiple Nash equilibria. One possible explanation for this is that the manager recommends to the users an action profile sustained by the intervention rule he chooses so that the action profile becomes a focal point [7] . The manager's problem of finding an optimal intervention rule can be expressed as
Analytical Results
In this section, we derive analytical results about sustainable action profiles and intervention equilibria imposing the following assumption.
a 0 and a 0 can be interpreted as the minimal and maximal intervention actions of the intervention device, respectively. For given a ∈ A, the users and the intervention device receive the highest (resp. lowest) payoff when the intervention device takes the minimal (resp. maximal) intervention action.
This allows the intervention device to reward or punish all the users at the same time.
We first characterize the set of sustainable action profiles, E. The following class of intervention rules is useful to characterize E. 
Note that an extreme intervention rule uses only the two extreme points of A 0 . With an extreme intervention rule, the intervention device chooses the most preferred action for the users when they follow the target action profile while choosing the least preferred action when they deviate. Hence, an extreme intervention rule provides the strongest incentive for sustaining a given target action profile, which leads us to the following lemma.
Proof. Suppose that a * ∈ E. Then there exists an intervention rule f such that
, for all i ∈ N , where the first and the third inequalities follow from (6).
Let F e be the set of all extreme intervention rules, i.e., F e = {fã ∈ F :ã ∈ A}. Also, define E e = ∪ f ∈F e E(f ) = {a ∈ A : ∃f ∈ F e such that f sustains a}. By applying Lemma 1, we can obtain the following results.
Theorem 1. (i) a * ∈ E if and only if
Then f a * sustains a * , and thus a * ∈ E. The converse follows from Lemma 1.
(ii) E ⊃ E e follows from F ⊃ F e , while E ⊂ E e follows from Lemma 1.
(iii) Suppose that (f * , a * ) is an intervention equilibrium. Then by Definition 2, f * sustains a * , and v
. This proves that (f a * , a * ) is an intervention equilibrium. Theorem 1 shows that there is no loss of generality in three senses when we restrict attention to extreme intervention rules. First, in order to test whether there exists an intervention rule that sustains a given action profile, it suffices to consider only the extreme intervention rule having the action profile as its target action profile. Second, the set of action profiles that can be sustained by an intervention rule remains the same when we consider only extreme intervention rules. Third, if there exists an optimal intervention rule, we can find an optimal intervention rule among extreme intervention rules.
Note that the role of extreme intervention rules is analogous to that of trigger strategies in repeated games with perfect monitoring. To generate the set of equilibrium payoffs, it suffices to consider trigger strategies that trigger the most severe punishment in case of a deviation. Under Assumption 1, the maximal intervention action a 0 plays a similar role to mutual minmaxing [4] in that it provides the strongest threat to deter a deviation. The next theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which an extreme intervention rule together with its target action profile constitutes an intervention equilibrium. Theorem 2. (f a * , a * ) is an intervention equilibrium if and only if a * ∈ E and u 0 (a 0 , a * ) ≥ u 0 (a 0 , a) for all a ∈ E.
Proof. Suppose that (f a * , a * ) is an intervention equilibrium. Then f a * sustains a * , and thus a * ∈ E. Also,
Suppose that a * ∈ E and u 0 (a 0 , a * ) ≥ u 0 (a 0 , a) for all a ∈ E. To prove that (f a * , a * ) is an intervention equilibrium, we need to show (i) f a * sustains a * , and (ii) u 0 (f a * (a * ), a * ) ≥ v f 0 (a) for all (f, a) ∈ F × A such that a ∈ E(f ). Since a * ∈ E, (i) follows from Lemma 1. To prove (ii), choose
where the first inequality follows from a ∈ E.
Theorem 2 implies that if we obtain an action profile a * such that a * ∈ arg max a∈E u 0 (a 0 , a), we can use it to construct an intervention equilibrium and thus an optimal intervention rule. 
Illustrative Example
In this section, we discuss an example to illustrate the results in Section 3. Consider a wireless network with two users and an intervention device interfering with each other. The action of user i is its usage level, where A i = [0, a i ] for i = 0, 1, 2. a i is the maximum usage level of user i. The total usage level is given by a 0 + a 1 + a 2 . The quality of service is determined by the total usage level, following the relationship
where q, b > 0 and [x] + = max{x, 0}. The payoff of user i ∈ {1, 2} is given by the product of the quality received and its usage level,
The system objective is given by social welfare, which is defined as the sum of the payoffs of the users,
Note that if there is no intervention device (i.e., if a 0 is held fixed at 0), the example is identical to the Cournot duopoly model with a linear demand function and zero production cost. The corresponding Cournot duopoly game achieves the symmetric social optimum at a 1 = a 2 = a L := q/4b while it has the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium at a 1 = a 2 = a H := q/3b, as depicted in Figure 1 . Hence, the goal of the manager is to improve upon the inefficient outcome (a H , a H ) by introducing the intervention device in the network.
Given the structure of the intervention game in this example, the capability of the interven-tion device is determined by its maximum intervention level a 0 . In the following, we investigate sustainable action profiles and those that constitute an intervention equilibrium as we vary a 0 .
If the intervention device cannot affect the payoffs of the users (a 0 = 0), the non-cooperative outcome (a H , a H ) is the only sustainable action profile that is consistent with the self-interest of the users. On the other hand, if the intervention device can apply a sufficiently high intervention level (a 0 ≥ q/b), it has the ability to degrade the quality to zero no matter what action profile the users choose. Since the payoffs of the users are non-negative, the punishment from using a 0 is strong enough to make every action profile sustainable. We can also find a condition on a 0 that enables f (a L ,a L ) to sustain the symmetric social optimum (a L , a L ). With a 0 ≥ (3
) is an intervention equilibrium by Theorem 2. 
